



# Artisan Focus Fund

QUARTERLY  
Commentary

Investor Class: ARTTX | Advisor Class: APDTX | Institutional Class: APHTX

As of 31 December 2023

## Investment Process

Our investment approach is based on idea generation, a systematic framework for analyzing companies and proactive risk management. Utilizing this approach, we seek to construct a focused portfolio designed to maximize alpha while limiting downside risk over the long term.

### Idea Generation

We believe a key element in alpha generation is finding areas where our views on industry fundamentals differ from consensus estimates. In this pursuit, we seek to identify inflections in multi-year trends which may be caused by changes in supply/demand dynamics, societal behavior, market conditions, technology, laws/regulations and business models, among other variables. We believe these inflections are often misunderstood by market participants, and can lead to powerful re-ratings of industries and companies. Identifying themes helps us develop a focused universe of companies to analyze more thoroughly.

### Systematic Analytical Framework

We apply a systematic framework for analyzing companies across sectors and themes, creating a repeatable and methodical decision-making process. Our proprietary company models focus on multi-year earnings power differentiation, expected outcome scenario analysis, return on invested capital and discounted cash flow valuations. Visual outputs are then produced through our internally developed technology solutions, allowing us to consistently evaluate positions across the portfolio.

### Proactive Risk Management

We incorporate risk management into all stages of our investment process. Metrics evaluated include crowding, correlation, volatility, stress tests, liquidity, factor analysis and macro drivers, all of which inform portfolio construction and position sizing. We also use various instruments, such as options, in an effort to magnify alpha and minimize downside.

## Team Overview

The investment team applies the same approach to idea generation and fundamental company analysis that Portfolio Manager Chris Smith has honed throughout his career. Research analysts are sector specialists with deep knowledge of their coverage areas. Our process blends a collaborative team mentality with individual accountability.

## Portfolio Management



Christopher Smith  
Portfolio Manager

## Investment Results (%)

As of 31 December 2023	Average Annual Total Returns						
	QTD	YTD	1 Yr	3 Yr	5 Yr	10 Yr	Inception
<b>Investor Class: ARTTX</b>	<b>11.69</b>	<b>15.63</b>	<b>15.63</b>	<b>1.80</b>	<b>12.60</b>	—	<b>15.48</b>
<b>Advisor Class: APDTX</b>	<b>11.80</b>	<b>16.02</b>	<b>16.02</b>	<b>2.01</b>	<b>12.83</b>	—	<b>15.65</b>
<b>Institutional Class: APHTX</b>	<b>11.90</b>	<b>16.10</b>	<b>16.10</b>	<b>2.12</b>	<b>12.86</b>	—	<b>15.68</b>
S&P 500® Index	11.69	26.29	26.29	10.00	15.69	—	12.98

Source: Artisan Partners/S&P. Returns for periods less than one year are not annualized. Class inception: Investor (24 April 2017); Advisor (31 July 2018); Institutional (3 February 2020). For the period prior to inception, each of Advisor Class and Institutional Class's performance is the Investor Class's return for that period ("Linked Performance"). Linked Performance has not been restated to reflect expenses of the Advisor or Institutional Class and each share's respective returns during that period would be different if such expenses were reflected.

Expense Ratios	ARTTX	APDTX	APHTX
Annual Report 30 Sep 2023	1.30	1.12	1.03
Prospectus 30 Sep 2022 <sup>1</sup>	1.25	1.11	1.02

<sup>1</sup>See prospectus for further details.

Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results. Investment returns and principal values will fluctuate so that an investor's shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance may be lower or higher than that shown. Call 800.344.1770 for current to most recent month-end performance. Performance reflects agreements to limit the Fund's expenses, which would reduce performance if not in effect. The Fund's investments in initial public offerings (IPOs) made a material contribution to performance. IPO investments may contribute significantly to a small portfolio's return, an effect that will generally decrease as assets grow. IPO investments may be unavailable in the future.



*"The best way out is always through."*  
 —Robert Frost

As we turn the calendar over and look forward to our seventh year at the Antero Peak Group (a lucky number, they say), Robert Frost's quote very much aligns with our current sentiment.

**Exhibit 1: Returns Since Inception at Year End 2023**

Returns Since Inception	Cumulative	Annualized	Annualized Alpha
Artisan Focus Fund (ARTTX)	161.87%	15.48%	—
S&P 500® Index	126.24%	12.98%	2.50%
S&P 500® Equal Weight Index	97.31%	10.70%	4.78%

Source: Bloomberg/S&P/Antero Peak Group. **Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results.** Returns greater than one year are annualized unless otherwise noted. The S&P 500® Equal Weight Index (EWI) is the equal-weight version of the widely used S&P 500® Index. Fund Inception: 24 Apr 2017.

The last year has been peculiar to say the least, but rather than make an unjustified change to our core philosophy as a way out, we have remained disciplined within our investment process. After staying the course, we now see strong grounds for optimism in our results looking forward. Market breadth is finally balancing out, our backlog of compelling themes that fit our process continues to expand, and the broader earnings environment remains challenging. These are the conditions that have led to our best years, and these are the conditions that make us most excited. As such, we now believe we are through this unusual period, and the future is looking brighter.

As a reminder, we build our portfolio based on our research, driven by a tried-and-true process with clear objectives. We manage relative volatility using a factor-based risk model. We do not own stocks or sectors in the benchmark simply because they are there, that is, to manage tracking error. We own stocks that we believe are inflecting, are revising upward and have expanding returns on capital. We believe the narrow construction of returns in 2023, combined with the ever more concentrated nature of the index (discussed in our [Q3 2023 letter](#)), create a great opportunity for alpha going forward. This is because idiosyncratic, or stock-specific, risk is likely to remain elevated near term, creating an above-average opportunity set for differentiation.

**Performance Review**

In Q4 2023, the Artisan Focus Fund returned 11.69%. This was in line with the advance of the S&P 500® Index (all returns in USD unless stated otherwise). During the quarter, we finally saw breadth in the market widen out, which led to more predictable relative performance. For the year, the Fund gained 15.63%, which trailed the S&P 500® Index's return of 26.29% but exceeded the S&P 500® Equal Weight Index by 1.76%.

**Exhibit 2: 2023 Performance**

	2023 Total Return
Artisan Focus Fund (ARTTX)	15.63%
S&P 500® Index	26.29%
S&P 500® Equal Weight Index	13.87%
Magnificent Seven	76.00%
Other 493	13.30%

Source: Bloomberg/S&P/Antero Peak Group. **Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results.** The S&P 500® Equal Weight Index (EWI) is the equal-weight version of the widely used S&P 500® Index. The Magnificent Seven includes Apple, Microsoft, Meta, Alphabet, Tesla, Amazon and Nvidia.

Although it may seem strange considering the disappointing headline performance, as a team we feel we executed against our process objectives quite well. We correctly identified several areas that realized sizable fundamental differentiation, accelerating underlying trends and expanding returns on capital that led to strong alpha generation. This good work, however, was outshined by the benchmark, which generated exceptionally large gains in its top holdings (the Magnificent Seven). Perplexing us most perhaps were the members of this cohort that did so despite steady negative earnings revisions throughout the year.


**The S&P 500® Index: An Even More Formidable Opponent in 2023**

In our [Q3 2021 letter](#), we laid out an analysis of what historically drives alpha within our industry. The analysis revealed that empirically most investors are "right" in their individual stock ideas about 50% of the time and there is a remarkably low deviation from this mean, with the worst around 45% and the best around 55%. What naturally follows is that alpha generation is ultimately driven by the magnitude of the ratio of winners versus losers. The anatomy of good performance is then typically constructed by winners winning big and losers losing small. In that letter, we called this "slugging."

In 2023, the benchmark displayed an incredibly high slugging rate and an extremely low hit rate. Simply put, *the benchmark itself was a nearly optimally sized portfolio heading into 2023, displaying an incredible pair of 3 standard deviation results in "slugging" on the positive side and "hit rate" on the negative side.*

Only 27% of the S&P constituents beat the index for 2023. This represented a 2.7 standard deviation event from the previous 20-year mean of 49%, which is the lowest figure observed this century.


**Exhibit 3: The Number of Stocks Beating the S&P 500® Index Was Extremely Low in 2023**



Source: Bloomberg/S&P. As of 31 Dec 2023. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results.

Slugging, on the contrary, landed dramatically in the opposite direction. The index gained 12.4X as much on winners than it lost on losers versus a long-term average of 2.6X. This represents a 3 standard deviation and the highest level on record for the data we examined and likely a once-in-a-career occurrence.

**Exhibit 4: The S&P 500® Index Was a Nearly Optimally Sized Portfolio in 2023**




Source: Bloomberg/S&P. As of 31 Dec 2023. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results. Slugging Rate measures the ratio of average gains on profitable investments versus the average losses on non-profitable investments.

Given that our approach emphasizes an independently constructed portfolio through research, the deck was clearly stacked against us last year, and the S&P 500® Index was simply very hard to beat in 2023. On the other hand, the path the S&P 500® Index took to get to its 26.3% return was highly improbable, and a rare case where “hugging” the index was rewarded.

Our metrics were counterintuitively pretty good in 2023, with our slugging ratio about in line with our long-term average.


**Exhibit 5: Our 2023 Slugging Rate Was Similar to Historical Norms but Fell Dramatically Below the S&P 500® Index's**



Source: Antero Peak Group/Bloomberg. As of 31 Dec 2023. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results. Slugging Rate measures the ratio of average gains on profitable investments versus the average losses on non-profitable investments.

In short, what much of this amounts to is a market with very low breadth.

**Exhibit 6: S&P 500® Index Laggards Proportionately Dominated the Market in 2023**



Source: Bloomberg/S&P. Based on S&P constituent returns for calendar year 2023. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results.

This dynamic eased in Q4 with market contributors broadening out to a more normal level, with 51% of the members beating the index.

**Exhibit 7: Q4 2023 Displayed Increased Breadth**



Source: PSC Macro. As of 31 Dec 2023. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results.

### Idiosyncratic Challenges of an Extremely Narrow Market

Despite this dynamic, we made some excellent stock picks this year, including TransDigm, Visa, Linde, Quanta, General Electric, Howmet, Nvidia and many others. Something we like to see is that our biggest winners universally correspond to sharply rising estimate revisions. This points to good research execution. As we've made mention of before, the realities described next highlight more specifically the challenge and frustration faced in 2023, which we believe will not be repeated in 2024.

Take, for example, TransDigm, a core position in our Aerospace Normalization theme. On average, we held about 4.4% of our capital in TransDigm in 2023, the company's earnings were revised upward by 23%, and the stock was up approximately 65%, exceeding the S&P 500® Index by 38% and the S&P 500® Equal Weight Index return by 51%. TransDigm contributed about 254bps to our performance last year. Visa was also noteworthy. We held about 4% of our capital in the stock on average, its earnings were revised upward by 3%, and it generated 12% alpha versus the S&P 500® Equal Weight Index. We made about 86bps on Visa. Linde's earnings were revised upward by 9%, returned 27% for the year and exceeded the materials sector of the S&P 500® Index by about 15%. We generated about 108bps of profit from Linde.

Surprisingly, despite declining earnings revisions of 2% and 40%, Apple and Tesla had 2023 returns of 49% and 102%, respectively. This cost us approximately 430bps of performance—*offsetting nearly all of the noteworthy contributions from TransDigm, Visa and Linde.*

**Exhibit 8: Some Good Work Got Rapidly Wiped Out by the S&P 500® Index's Largest Members**

	Revisions	Rate of Change	Relative CTR (bps)
TransDigm	23%	Accelerated	254
Visa	3%	Accelerated	86
Linde	9%	Accelerated	108
<b>Total</b>			<b>448</b>
	Revisions	Rate of Change	Relative CTR (bps)
Apple	-2%	Decelerated	-322
Tesla	-40%	Decelerated	-105
<b>Total</b>			<b>-427</b>

Source: Bloomberg/FactSet/S&P/Antero Peak Group. For the calendar year 2023. Relative CTR represents the security's net contribution to the Fund relative to the benchmark. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results.

Over time, we think this will prove to be a rare alignment of conditions that allowed this to happen. Even though 2023 was frustrating, we believe that by sticking to our process—putting capital where we see inflection points, earnings revisions and expanding ROICs—our investors will be rewarded.

### Some Mathematical Realities

It is no easy feat to “beat the market.” To do so consistently, we believe we need a steady flow of differentiated views about industries and companies and a very high bar for depth and breadth of our research. Critically we must have the ability to correctly concentrate capital in the best performing areas. One of the key reasons the market is so hard to beat is that there is a finite supply of alpha for active managers to chase. Mathematically, this is continually shrinking as passive investing rises. Clients rightly hold managers accountable, and the worst are discarded, and the average likely gets better. So, underperforming meaningfully is very risky for an active manager—nobody wants to be an outlier to the downside. This causes most managers to lock-in mediocrity by “hugging” the benchmark and adding fees. As a matter of course, they fail their investors over time. What's worse is this often occurs slowly as years of fees and slightly negative alpha continuously accumulate, and only over time is the magnitude of value destruction appreciated. We have never and will never run our business this way. We also believe that this dynamic is good for us. The available alpha is consequently left for a small minority of true active managers to generate differentiated performance—we are one of those managers.

We are proud to say we have generated alpha for clients over time versus the benchmark—the Artisan Focus Fund has compounded at a net annualized rate of 15.5% versus the S&P 500® Index's 13.0% since inception. Yet, we must recognize that after almost seven years, the construction of this return has not been what we would call “low tracking.” We have beaten the benchmark by a lot at times and lagged by a lot at times, particularly in recent years. Our risk model has proven reliable in minimizing tracking error over shorter periods, but over longer periods of time, differences accumulate, which is a good thing, that is the alpha we aim to create over cycles. The increasing concentration of the benchmark is a catch-22, as it further complicates this goal of low tracking but likely expands the alpha pool for active managers.

We do, however, recognize the value that a low tracking error and consistent smaller alpha outcomes create for our investors. Upon reflecting on the last seven years of data, it is clear that we have a proven and steady capability of generating sector neutral alpha—120bps in 2023 and 370bps annualized since 1 May 2017.

**Exhibit 9: Sector Neutral Alpha**

Each Stock Hedged 1:1 by S&P 500® Index's Sector

	2023	Since 1 May 2017 (Annualized)
Pure Sector Alpha	1.2%	3.7%


Source: FactSet/S&P/Antero Peak Group. As of 31 Dec 2023. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results. Sector Neutral Alpha represents the aggregated monthly alpha generated by the portfolio's holdings versus their respective sector within the S&P 500® Index, compounded over the period indicated in the table.

### Thoughts on the Earnings Backdrop

The downward revision cycle that began 18 months ago is maturing. The S&P 500® Index's constituents' 2023 and 2024 estimates bottomed in July after a 12%/10% peak to trough downward revision. Since then, estimates have stayed roughly constant. On the surface, this seems to be a normal, healthy base for upward revisions, particularly with leading indicators like the ISM Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index mathematically having an upward bias, having spent the last 12 months in contraction territory. In addition, the Federal Reserve seems to be signaling an incrementally more dovish stance at each subsequent meeting, relieving pressure on tight financial conditions.

Like some of the other unusual dynamics referenced, this cycle has been anything but normal, and revisions and markets overall still face important risks. Of note is the relationship of the S&P 500® Index to the jobs market, where a long-term 95% correlation exists between job openings and the level of the index. This tight relationship recently broke down in dramatic fashion. These measures, which have historically moved in near lockstep fashion, are now moving in opposite directions—job openings are quickly falling, while equity markets are rapidly rising.

**Exhibit 10:** Job Openings' Tight Correlation to the S&P 500® Index Recently Broke Down



Source: Bloomberg/S&P. As of 31 Dec 2023. Past performance does not guarantee and is not a reliable indicator of future results.

This backdrop also begs the question as to what parts of the market will lead us on the way out of this contraction. Historically, a bottoming PMI supports high beta and more cyclical areas of the economy, but much of that appears to have already occurred as the market strongly favored these areas over quality in 2023.


**Exhibit 11:** High Beta Decoupled With Underlying Macro Conditions in 2023



Source: FactSet/S&P. As of 31 Dec 2023. ISM Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index is a survey-based economic gauge of the level of economic activity in the manufacturing sector of the United States as compared to the prior month. Values below 50 are considered contracting, while values above 50 are considered expanding. High Beta Versus Low Beta (HBLB Index) measures the relative performance of high beta versus low beta constituents of S&P 500® Index. HBLB Index value is calculated by dividing the S&P 500® High Beta Index by the S&P 500® Low Volatility Index. HBLB indexed to 1.0 as of 31 Dec 2015.

Our quality bias was a headwind to us in 2023 that we think is likely to reverse.

**Exhibit 12:** High Beta and Cyclical Appear to Have Led the Economic Recovery, Causing Our Quality Bias to Be a Headwind



Source: FactSet/Bloomberg/S&P. As of 11 Dec 2023. All factors indexed to 1.0 as of 31 Dec 2022. High Beta Versus Low Beta (HBLB Index) measures the relative performance of high beta versus low beta constituents of S&P 500® Index. The HBLB Index value is calculated by dividing the S&P 500® High Beta Index by the S&P 500® Low Volatility Index. Cyclical represented by an equal notional pair trade of long high beta cyclicals and short defensives within the S&P 500® Index. Quality represented by the Dow Jones U.S. Thematic Market Neutral Quality Index.

In summary, the earnings outlook is uncertain. This emphasizes our strengths in modeling and diligence on differentiated themes—of which we have a large backlog with relatively benign economic sensitivity that we believe can thrive on their own merits.

### Theme Updates

We have written on artificial intelligence for more than a year. Early in 2023, we began to look below the surface on what AI and its deployment would mean for the value of data itself (within our Data Monetization theme) as well as the practicality of widescale adoption and what is needed for it. We believe the breadth of implications surrounding developments in AI are just beginning to bubble to the surface on the industrials side. We expect AI to drive a step-function acceleration in the need for power generation, electrical equipment and cooling technologies, which in turn will require more unique solutions to accommodate the surge in demand that comes from the build-out of AI.


We note several key forecasts behind this expected transformation in demand for data-center providers and adjacencies that are overlapping with our De-Globalization theme and are creating an expanding opportunity set. Electrical demand needed to power data centers is expected to increase 50% by 2027. Meanwhile, AI applications, which utilize graphic processing units (GPUs), draw 2.0X–2.5X the electricity of traditional computer processing units (CPUs). The growth in total data created globally is expected to more than triple over the next five years (2027 estimate versus 2022).

Given these dynamics, data center operators will be required to upgrade existing electrical equipment and adopt more advanced cooling technologies. For example, we note that only 5% of data centers currently have any form of liquid cooling, which is critical technology that allows for the necessary power density to run GPUs. Companies are also looking to deploy new technologies outside of the data center—partnering with renewable energy providers—to

help reduce the stress that data centers are expected to have on the overall power grid.

The build-out of AI and burden on the overall power grid in the United States will likely keep utility capex elevated, providing extended visibility for companies like Quanta and GE Vernova, which have direct exposure to these secular trends.

**Exhibit 13:** The Volume of Data Captured, Copied and Consumed Over the Next 5 Years Will Double the Total Amount of the Prior 12 Years



Source: Antero Peak Group/Statista/Veriv Investor Day 2023/TD Cowen. As of 31 Dec 2023. Estimates are based on the team’s analysis and are subject to material revision.

We also believe, after two years of declines, the global compute and memory market is at a unique inflection point. DRAM (dynamic random-access memory) end market demand for smartphones, PCs and general-purpose servers has shifted to positive year-over-year growth in Q4 2023 after two years of declines. This was, in part, driven by the depletion of excess production and inventory imbalances post-COVID, along with much of the remaining inventory at suppliers being DDR4 with an ongoing transition underway to the leading-edge node, DDR5. This is driving meaningful increases in pricing as demand will grow ahead of supply in 2024 for the first time since 2020.

And while the cyclical recovery and supply discipline are interesting, the nascency and growth potential of high bandwidth memory (HBM) makes this memory upcycle particularly exciting. HBM is a type of DRAM technology whereby 2.5D/3D vertical stacking of DRAM dies enable much wider memory interfaces allowing for increased bandwidth with less power required—making HBM particularly well suited and necessary for the training and inferencing associated with large language models. We estimate that AI accelerator demand will continue to grow at a rapid pace and anticipate that the HBM market will increase 7X between 2023 to 2025 going from a high-single-digit percentage of the overall DRAM market to almost 30%.

### Summary

As we look to 2024 and beyond, we feel excited about the existing portfolio and expect increasing competition for capital given the backlog of exciting new investable themes. Our underlying modeling accuracy and execution have been strong, and we are always looking to improve, but we feel our process-oriented approach should continue to serve us well going forward.

We thank you for your ongoing support and trust with your capital during a challenging period and will continue to work to provide the best outcomes for our partners.

Separately, the team reads to further develop perspectives and enjoyed “The Anthology of Balaji: A Guide to Technology, Truth, and Building the Future” this quarter.

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For the purpose of determining the Fund's holdings, exposures are delta-adjusted at the issuer level and may include multiple securities of the same issuer. The holdings mentioned above comprise the following percentages of the portfolio net assets as of 31 Dec 2023: Microsoft Corp 9.3%, General Electric Co 6.4%, Visa Inc 4.7%, TransDigm Group Inc 4.4%, NVIDIA Corp 0.8%, Howmet Aerospace Inc 2.7%, Linde PLC 1.8%, Quanta Services Inc 1.6%, Amazon 5.5%. Securities named in the commentary, but not listed here are not held in the Fund as of the date of this report. Portfolio holdings are subject to change without notice and are not intended as recommendations of individual securities.

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Portfolio statistics are obtained from various data sources and intended to provide a general view of the portfolio, or Index, at a point in time. Artisan Partners excludes outliers when calculating portfolio characteristics and may use data from a related security to calculate statistics if information is unavailable for a particular security. Percent of net assets represents the portfolio's exposures based on the economic value of investments (including delta-adjusting options exposures). Delta-adjusted options exposure is a measure of the market exposure created by the options and accounts for the sensitivity of options to changes in price of the underlying security. In comparison, measuring the exposure of an option at the market value of the option or notional value can understate or overstate, respectively, the economic exposure and risk. This estimate of portfolio exposure is only an approximation of the portfolio at a point in time.

Attribution is used to evaluate the investment management decisions which affected the portfolio's performance when compared to a benchmark index. Attribution is not exact, but should be considered an approximation of the relative contribution of each of the factors considered.

Theme classifications are at the sole discretion of the team. Themes and constituents are as of the date indicated and are subject to change. Certain holdings have been reclassified subsequent to initial investment, which has impacted theme performance during the period. Portfolio sector classifications are defined by the investment team based on GICS.

**Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)** is a measure of how well a company generates cash flow relative to capital invested in the business. **Discounted cash flow (DCF)** is a valuation method used to estimate the value of an investment based on its expected future cash flows. **Slugging Rate** measures the ratio of average gains on profitable investments versus the average losses on non-profitable investments. **Magnificent Seven (M7)** is a term used to describe large US companies: Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Tesla, NVIDIA, Microsoft and Meta.

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